Did JFK start the Vietnam War
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Did JFK start the Vietnam War?
In: Vietnam War, John F Kennedy [Edit categories]

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== who started the war ==Eisenhower/Nixon
NO. JFK inherited the growing conflict from Eisenhower/Nixon.

The "Vietnam War", which was a civil war was well underway before the US had any involvement, Kennedy sent additional American 'advisors' for a total of 16.200 (an increase of 4.000) from IKE's build-up after taking over from the defeated French expedition, to help the South Vietnamese. On Oct 6 1963 he signed an executive (NSAM 263) National Security Action Memorandum) report that provided for the removal of 1000 troops in December 1963 and the vast majority of troops were to be out by 1965. He strongly felt that this was a no win scenario, and that the Vietnamese people were not behind the corrupt government of South Viet-Nam . After JFK was killed, LBJ countermanded that order with NSAM 273, and increased the number of troops dramatically, eventually to 500.000 within 2 years, eventually resulting in the deaths of 58.000 American soldiers throughout the Johnson and Nixon presidencies. These soldiers died in vain, and tore the USA apart with civil strife and eventually culminated with the loss of American's trust in government with the final insult of the "Watergate travesty" which had ties all the way back to that dark day in Dallas on November 22, 1963, when America lost it's last independent leader, before the corporate military industrial take-over. JFK had warned us all . And we did not listen.. Now that's the way it was.

Kennedy had nothing to do with the start of the the Vietnam conflict. It was a civil war in Vietnam.

Eisenhower sent the first "advisors" into Vietnam on 12 February 1955. There were between 9-12 thousand US military serving in Vietnam when President Kennedy took office. CAT/Air American had a strong presence in support of the French long before that time.

NSAM 263

President Kennedy Issues NSAM 263, Ordering the Withdrawl of 1,000 Military Personnel from Vietnam by the End of 1963
Topics: John F. Kennedy, Vietnam War, Vietnam, United States, Communism, Containment Sort: Votes Recently Added
Share Kennedy increased the number of U.S. military in Vietnam from 800 to 16,300. It remains a point of some controversy among historians whether or not Vietnam would have escalated to the point it did had Kennedy served out his full term and been re-elected in 1964. Fueling the debate are statements made by Kennedy and Johnson's Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara that Kennedy was strongly considering pulling out of Vietnam after the 1964 election. In the film "The Fog of War", not only does McNamara say this, but a tape recording of Lyndon Johnson confirms that Kennedy was planning to withdraw from Vietnam, a position Johnson states he strongly disapproved of. Additional evidence is Kennedy's National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 263, dated October 11, 1963, which ordered withdrawal of 1,000 military personnel by the end of 1963. Nevertheless, given the stated reason for the overthrow of the Diem government, such action would have been a policy reversal, but Kennedy was generally moving in a less hawkish direction in the Cold War since his acclaimed speech about World Peace at American University the previous June 10, 1963. According to historian Lawrence Freedman, regarding Kennedy's statements about withdrawing from Vietnam, it was, "less of a definite decision than a working assumption, based on a hope for stability rather than an expectation of chaos".

After Kennedy's assassination, new President Lyndon B. Johnson immediately reversed his predecessor's order to withdraw 1,000 military personnel by the end of 1963 with his own NSAM 273 on November 26, 1963.

LBJ's NSAM 273
President Johnson Commits the U.S. to the Vietnam War

NOVEMBER 26, 1963

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 273

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Administrator, AID
The Director, USIA

The President has reviewed the discussions of South Vietnam which occurred in Honolulu, and has discussed the matter further with Ambassador Lodge. He directs that the following guidance be issued to all concerned:

1. It remains the central object of the United States in South Vietnam to assist the people and Government of that country to win their contest against the externally directed and supported Communist conspiracy. The test of all U.S. decisions and actions in this area should be the effectiveness of their contribution to this purpose.

2. The objectives of the United States with respect to the withdrawal of U.S. military personnel remain as stated in the White House statement of October 2, 1963.

3. It is a major interest of the United States Government that the present provisional government of South Vietnam should be assisted in consolidating itself and in holding and developing increased public support. All U.S. officers should conduct themselves with this objective in view.

4. The President expects that all senior officers of the Government will move energetically to insure the full unity of support for established U.S. policy in South Vietnam. Both in Washington and in the field, it is essential that the Government be unified. It is of particular importance that express or implied criticism of officers of other branches be scrupulously avoided in all contacts with the Vietnamese Government and with the press. More specifically, the President approves the following lines of action developed in the discussions of the Honolulu meeting of November 20. The offices of the Government to which central responsibility is assigned are indicated in each case.

5. We should concentrate our own efforts, and insofar as possible we should persuade the Government of South Vietnam to concentrate its efforts, on the critical situation in the Mekong Delta. This concentration should include not only military but political, economic, social, educational and informational effort. We should seek to turn the tide not only of battle but of belief, and we should seek to increase not only the control of hamlets but the productivity of this area, especially where the proceeds can be held for the advantage of anti-Communist forces

.(Action: The whole country team under the direct supervision of the Ambassador.)

6. Programs of military and economic assistance should be maintained at such levels that their magnitude and effectiveness in the eyes of the Vietnamese Government do not fall below the levels sustained by the United States in the time of the Diem Government. This does not exclude arrangements for economy on the MAP account with respect to accounting for ammunition, or any other readjustments which are possible between MAP and other U.S. defense resources. Special attention should be given to the expansion of the import, distribution, and effective use of fertilizer for the Delta.

(Action: AID and DOD as appropriate.)

7. Planning should include different levels of possible increased activity, and in each instance there should he estimates of such factors as:

A. Resulting damage to North Vietnam;
B. The plausibility of denial;
C. Possible North Vietnamese retaliation;
D. Other international reaction.

Plans should be submitted promptly for approval by higher authority.

(Action: State, DOD, and CIA.)

8. With respect to Laos, a plan should be developed and submitted for approval by higher authority for military operations up to a line up to 50 kilometers inside Laos, together with political plans for minimizing the international hazards of such an enterprise. Since it is agreed that operational responsibility for such undertakings should pass from CAS to MACV, this plan should include a redefined method of political guidance for such operations, since their timing and character can have an intimate relation to the fluctuating situation in Laos. (Action: State, DOD, and CIA.)

9. It was agreed in Honolulu that the situation in Cambodia is of the first importance for South Vietnam, and it is therefore urgent that we should lose no opportunity to exercise a favorable influence upon that country. In particular a plan should be developed using all available evidence and methods of persuasion for showing the Cambodians that the recent charges against us are groundless.

(Action: State.)

10. In connection with paragraphs 7 and 8 above, it is desired that we should develop as strong and persuasive a case as possible to demonstrate to the world the degree to which the Viet Cong is controlled, sustained and supplied from Hanoi, through Laos and other channels. In short, we need a more contemporary version of the Jordan Report, as powerful and complete as possible.

(Action: Department of State with other agencies as necessary.

Mc George Bundy

cc: Mr. Bundy
Mr. Forestal
Mr. Johnson
NSC File